In the first decade of the 21st century, America’s military has had to evolve to fight unconventional wars in foreign locations, and we have become a global-stabilization force. Our most pressing threats have come from non-state actors who survive in loosely affiliated international networks. With the advent of the Internet and the global economy, our enemies have fluid tactics and irregular weapons. The weapon of choice, the improvised explosive device (IED), has been developed by a global collaboration of different technological markets and by experts from chemists to electrical engineers. The power of these insurgency (IN) networks is illustrated perfectly with the Nigerian Christmas Day suicide bomber. This jihadist was trained in Yemen by al-Qaida, a Saudi Arabian-created insurgency group whose current power seat is located in the shadowy Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. America is confronting the real and present danger of al-Qaida on four continents. The human terrain is the demographical landscape of any civilization. Major General Flynn, U.S. Army (2010), a top commander in Afghanistan, recently noted that winning this terrain on a regional scale is essential for our success against a global anti-American insurgency.
The human terrain is a survey of the individual life experiences within a region or a culture. There are several population-centric questions that need to be addressed before a foreign counter-insurgency (COIN) force (America) can be successful. What are the region’s primary economic resources, and how can we protect these markets? What are the cultural differences within the subgroups of the region, and how can we dissolve any civil injustices? If a community must be displaced because its village has been destroyed, where can we place the population without developing a volatile region? Where are the civil engineering hubs of the region, and how do we ensure an electric grid’s operational integrity? What (IN) forces will we be facing, and what actionable intelligence do we have about them? Dr. O’Neil (2005) explains the strengths and weaknesses of nine categories of insurgencies. He stresses that, regardless of the insurgents’ type, motive, inception or tactics, COIN forces must understand the local population if we are to defeat the insurgents. The majority of IN are motivated by a civil rights struggle, racial discrimination, religious oppression, or a sociological/economic caste system that holds a subpopulation below another. Dissolving these civil struggles is a key to our stabilizations efforts. The repercussions of not stabilizing the human terrain are illustrated with macabre accuracy in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts.
In 2002, General Wilson (USA) was given the task of combating al-Qaida in the Philippines. He implemented his COIN Diamond Model, a strategy that focuses on developing the human terrain. He had overwhelming, time-tested success with his strategy. His small force of 1,300 specially trained American soldiers was able to build a native population COIN force. He understood the human terrain and he immersed his forces in it. He used foreign-aid specialists to assess humanitarian needs. He deployed civil-engineering specialists to help sustain a quality of life and to train the native population in job skills. Regional demographic experts and language-dialect specialists were utilized to explore and translate cultural diversity. The military’s mission was to train the native military into a native COIN force.
By applying this population-centric philosophy, Gen. Wilson gained the native population’s trust. He was able to right civil injustices so that foreign insurgents could not recruit locally. Comparing the Basilan, Philippines “Diamond Model” with the U.S. strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan, the value of the native human terrain becomes staggeringly clear. A strategy similar to the Diamond Model was utilized in the Sunni Awakening operations that took place in western Iraq in 2007. We were able to stabilize this al-Qaida safe haven by training a native security force so that it could defend against foreign insurgents and oust all active and passive support for al-Qaida from local communities.
America has to embrace this population-centric mantra so that we can take away the insurgents’ active and passive support structures. An individual actively supports an IN if they take up arms with it or if they promote the dissent by actively recruiting, offering finical support, or refuge. Active support is easier for the U.S. to target because it takes the form of deliberate actions. We can close bank accounts that support IN, we can monitor Internet chat rooms that target recruits, and we can track businesses that sell IED components. Passive support stems from a community distrusting the U.S. COIN forces. Because of its subversive nature, it is much harder to prevent. America must reach out to the local civilian who notices a stranger in her village but says nothing to the American soldier on patrol, and the local merchant who supplies the terrorist out of fear or sympathy.
From Chairman Mao of the Chinese revolution to Osama Bin Laden, successful insurgency leaders have understood that their success lies in their ability to capture the human terrain of the region in which they are fighting. America’s COIN forces are at a constant strategic disadvantage because the native populations are foreign to us. For IN to be successful, all they have to do is survive to outlast us. To remove all the shadows and safe havens from our enemies we must develop the native human terrains.
- jfoxwell
Works Cited:
Flynn, M. Major General U.S.A. (Jan. 2010) Voices from the Field, Fixing Intel: A blueprint for making Intelligence relevant in Afghanistan Washington, D.C. Center for a New American Security
O’Neill (2005) Insurgency & Terrorism: From revolution to Apocalypse (2nd ed.) Dulles, VA. Potomac Books
Tadie, Eugene (PHD) (Jan – May 2010) International Security, Government-347,
George Mason University (2010)
Wlison, G. Major General (USA) (2006) Anatomy of a successful COIN operation: OEF-Philippines and indirect approach Military Review (Nov-Dec 2006) http:/findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_6_86/ai_n27084049/
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